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dad dad buu duGsadaa duGaaGna 
Geed1 – THe SOMALI DIASPORA 
IN THe UNITeD STATeS AND THeIR 
IMPACT ON THe AMeRICAN DOMeSTIC, 
SOCIAL AND SeCURITY SITUATION
The paper is dedicated to the Somali diaspora in the United States and its in-
fluence on the American domestic, social and security situation in relation to: 
1) Somali cultural, historical and religious background, 2) history and patterns
of U.S. Somali immigration, 3) analysis of the Somali cultural adaptation to
American society, 4) analysis of the remittances sent from diaspora back home
and certain associated patterns 5) potential among Somalis, especially young
Somalis, when it comes to the Islamic radicalization, 6) analysis of the Somalis
as part of Black African immigration. However, Somalis are not even close to be-
ing the largest migration group from Sub -Saharan Africa, for sure they are a sig-
nificant one. Settled mostly in Minnesota (mostly the Minneapolis urban area),
Columbus (Ohio), Seattle (Washington), Virginia, Washington D.C. metropol-
itan area, New York City metropolitan area, San Diego and Georgia, they creat-
ed a unique minority with significant impact on the whole picture of American
society and the American domestic and security situation.
Keywords: Somali diaspora, United States of America, migrations
1 The Somali proverb meaning: “Humans seek shelter with other humans, whereas animals seek forests 
or trees for protection”. See: C. M. Abdi, Elusive Jannah. The Somali Diaspora and a Borderless Muslim 
Identity, Minneapolis 2015, p. 57.
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INTRODUCTION
According to the U.S. Census, there are 30,000 Somalis currently living in the United 
States. However, community leaders’ estimates claim the number is much higher and 
may rise up to 150,000 people2. Although classified by the U.S. authorities as the Af-
rican migration, Somalis usually do not fit the typical success story of most African 
U.S. minorities. This phenomenon is related to the economic, social and cultural 
roots of the Somali diaspora.
The aim of the paper is to present the Somali diaspora in the United States and 
its influence on the American domestic, social and security situation through the 
relation to 1) Somali cultural, historical and religious background, 2) history and 
patterns of U.S. Somali immigration, 3) analysis of the Somali cultural adaptation to 
the American society, 4) analysis of the remittances sent from diaspora back home 
and certain patterns behind it, 5) potential among Somalis, especially young Somalis, 
when it comes to the Islamic radicalization, 6) analysis of the Somalis as part of Black 
African Immigration. Hence, the following research questions have been formulated:
1. What are the main difficulties associated with the Somali cultural adaptation to
American society?
2. What are the main patterns between remittances sent by the U.S. Somali dias-
pora?
3. Are American Somalis prone to Islamic radicalization?
4. Does Somali migration differ much from the rest of Black African immigration
in the USA?
Most of the counterfactual material was collected during the author’s research 
stay and expert interviews conducted by the author with the researchers in migra-
tion studies, security studies and African Studies at the African Studies Program 
at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in 
Washington D.C., awarded by The Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship 
Fund, (Sylff ), and implemented by queries conducted during the author’s research 
stay there.
The inductive approach was used, based on the formulation of general conclusions 
from conducted detailed research (critical analysis of the sources, documents, litera-
ture of the subject as well as consultations and interviews with the researchers and spe-
cialists in the field of the refugee, migration and security studies in order to receive the 
verifiable factual material), knowledge synthesis method. The proposed research was 
founded on both actors and institutional -oriented methodology. As far as the pro-
posed theoretical approach is concerned, the author used behavioural analysis3 of the 
2 Joshua Project, Somali in United States, at <https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/14983/US>, 
7 January 2016.
3 D. Sanders, ‘Behavioural Analysis’ in: D. Marsh, G. Stoker (eds.), Theory and Methods in Political Sci-
ence, New York 2010, pp. 23 -41 (Political Analysis).
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Somali group in the United States, supported by constructivism4 and the ‘scapegoat 
theory’ introduced by René Girard5.
CULTURAL BACKGROUND
It is believed that the Somali territory was inhabited around 1000 years ago by the 
Arabic families who arrived in the territory of what now is referred to as the Horn of 
Africa.6 Islam arrived in these territories together with the Persian and Arabic mer-
chants in the 11th -12th century, but still between the 13th -16th centuries, Somalis 
did participate in religion -motivated fights between Christians and Muslims7. Yet, 
today 99% of Somalis are Sunni Muslims and religion constitutes one of the most im-
portant parts of their identity. According to Raynel M. Shephard, Islam is one of the 
two most important identification factors for the Somalis in the United States, the 
other one is ethnicity. However, the second one is slightly more complicated in many 
cases, and especially among young people, religion might play a far more important 
role8. For Somalis, ethnic identification is rather attached to their clan or even sub-
-clan. Somalis are divided into the nomads (Samalle) and the minority herder popu-
lation called Sab. Therefore, the Somali language is divided into two basic dialects: 
the northern one, Maha, and the southern, Mai. Those distinctions are very often 
the reason why Somali community members first identify themselves as Muslims and 
then by their ethnicity. The Muslim tradition is also important when it comes to 
gender identification. A lot of effort and community work have been put into gender 
awareness among Somali women in the Somali community. However, still despite the 
economic factors or language abilities that in some cases should empower women, 
the traditional model is visible in distributing roles between men and women in the 
family, favouring males. Gender issues are very often the obstacle for access to educa-
tion among Somali women as it is not acceptable for them to attend gender -mixed 
schools9.
4 A. Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics’, International 
Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (1997), pp. 513 -553, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/002081897550447>.
5 R. Girard, Kozioł ofiarny, transl. by M. Goszczyńska, Łódź 1992 (Człowiek i Jego Cywilizacja).
6 By using the term Horn of Africa for the purpose of the article, the author will refer to its broader 
definition (sometimes also called as the Greater Horn of Africa) including: Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
South Sudan, Yemen, Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan.
7 I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali. Nation and State in the Horn of Africa, Athens, OH 2002, 
pp. 18 -40.
8 R. M. Shephard, Cultural Adaptation of Somali Refugee Youth, El Paso 2008, pp. 9 -44 (New Amer-
icans).
9 Ibid.
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THe HISTORY OF THe SOMALI MIGRATION 
TO THe UNITeD STATeS
Despite undertaken studies, Somali immigrants are still one of the least recognized 
minorities in the United States. It is the combination of African geographical back-
ground, Arabic -derived tradition, and the unique refugee experience that constitutes 
Somalis as a group that rarely fits any of the heretofore established frameworks related 
to the diaspora studies. It is commonly believed that the influx of Somalis into the 
United States started after the fall of Siad Barre’s regime and the outbreak of the Somali 
civil war in 1991. However, the first Somalis arrived in the United States back in the 
1980s after the introduction of the Refugee Act. The group mostly included the po-
litical opposition of the former dictator and inhabited the region of San Diego, which 
might be slightly surprising taking under consideration the present location of the ma-
jority of the Somali diaspora. Despite that, still the U.S. migration was rather small 
when compared to other African groups. A few factors might have affected this situa-
tion. Firstly, although Barre’s rule was no more than a dictatorship, still he introduced 
a lot of reforms – like land reform that put some social groups in privileged positions 
(like Barre’s sub -clan: Mareehaan) at the cost of the others10. Secondly, the introduc-
tion of The Refugee Act of 1980 that created The Federal Refugee Resettlement Pro-
gram11. Thirdly, the economic situation in Somalia, due to the hyper -militarization and 
Barre’s reforms, was getting worse and the state itself was on its road to collapse. Lastly, 
during the drought that occurred in the Horn of Africa in 1980s, it was easier and 
cheaper for most Somalis to make their way to Kenya or the Somali Region in Ethiopia 
and seek shelter there especially since some of them already had relatives living there 
and the community within the United States had just began to establish. The real out-
break of Somali migration waves to the United States erupted after the outbreak of civil 
war. It continues today, many of the Somalis first make their way to Kenya or Europe 
and from there decide on further asylum seeking or migration to the North American 
continent12. Typically, people follow the already existing communities when it comes 
to the place of their final destination in the United States of America. They choose to 
settle in Minnesota (mostly the Minneapolis urban area), Columbus (Ohio), Seattle 
(Washington), Virginia, the Washington D.C. metropolitan area, the New York City 
metropolitan area, San Diego or Georgia, because of the Somali communities which 
10 A. A. Osman, I. K. Souaré (eds.), Somalia at the Crossroads. Challenges and Perspectives on Reconstitut-
ing a Failed State, London 2007, pp. 10 -14.
11 According to the Office of Refugee Resettlement, the Refugee Act of 1980 created The Federal Refu-
gee Resettlement Program. The main aim of the program was to provide for the effective resettlement 
of refugees and to assist them to achieve economic self -sufficiency as quickly as possible after arrival 
in the United States. See: Office of the Refugee Resettlement, The Refugee Act, at <http://www.acf.
hhs.gov/programs/orr/resource/the -refugee -act>, 18 February 2016; The Refugee Act of 1980, Con-
gress.gov, at <https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th -congress/senate -bill/643>, 7 January 2016.
12 C. M. Abdi, Elusive Jannah…, pp. 169 -229.
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exist there already. In the case of Minnesota, it was also the prosperity of the 1990s in 
this state that encouraged Somali migration13.
Somali migration to the United States follows three general patterns:
 Resettlement – many of the refugees are being resettled in American territory 
through the Office of the Refugee Resettlement (ORR) and agencies in Kenya 
that are cooperating with it. According to the UNHCR, resettlement is defined 
as “the transfer of refugees from an asylum country to another state that has 
agreed to admit them and ultimately grant them permanent settlement”. In es-
sence, the resettlement process creates a new beginning for the refugees in the 
third country14. Somali refugees are often resettled to USA, Canada, Australia 
or Scandinavian countries.
 Family reunification process – many Somalis are being sponsored by their family 
members already living in the United States. However, the definition of family 
differs according to the American and Somali perspectives. According to U.S. 
Immigration Law, family reunification is divided into two basic categories: 1) 
immediate relatives of U.S. citizens (non -native spouses of U.S. citizens, unmar-
ried minor children (aged 21 or below) of U.S. citizens, orphans adopted by U.S. 
citizens, and the parents of U.S. citizens over the age of 21) – this category does 
not have any number ceiling, and (2) family sponsorship according to prefer-
ence categories (Unmarried, adult (age 21+) sons and daughters of U.S. citizens, 
spouses and unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. permanent resident aliens 
(“green card holders”), married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens, brothers and 
sisters of adult U.S. citizens) which is a numerically limited category and hence 
no single country can account for more than 7% of total admissions15.
 Some Somalis arrive as asylum seekers after making their way to one of the 
American airports. They ask for asylum and enter the U.S. territory as asylum 
seekers16. According to UNHCR, asylum seekers are defined as people who 
claim to be refugees, but they have not been granted refugee status yet, therefore 
under the international law they are not refugees yet17.
Therefore, most of the future diaspora members arrive in Kenya first, but due to the 
harsh living conditions and poverty among Kenyans themselves they decide to leave for 
the United States, very often paying enormous sums of money to be smuggled. As ob-
served by Cawo M. Abdi, the rate did rise drastically since the beginning of the 2000s, 
on average 10 times more18. In contradistinction to the American or European migra-
13 Source: author’s expert interviews with Dr. Lahra Smith (1 December 2015, Georgetown University, 
Washington D.C.) and Dr. Terrence Lyons (24 November 2015, George Mason University, Washing-
ton D.C.). Joshua Project, Somali in United States…
14 UNHCR, Resettlement, at <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a16b1676.html>, 7 January 2016.
15 R. McKay, Family Reunification, Migration Policy Institute, 1 May 2003, at <http://www.migration-
policy.org/article/family -reunification>, 7 January 2016.
16 C. M. Abdi, Elusive Jannah..., pp. 169 -229.
17 UNHCR, Asylum -Seekers, at <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c137.html>, 7 January 2016.
18 C.M. Abdi, Elusive Jannah…, pp. 31 -58.
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tion, those of the Somalis who choose to make their way to the Middle East (Saudi 
Arabia, United Arabic Emirates or in the past, Yemen) or South Africa usually avoid 
the Dadaab refugee camps’ complex and make their way directly to these destinations. 
The dominant population trend in the Somali U.S. migration are the Gosha people 
(Somali Bantu) and Benadiri Somali. Both groups are excluded from the main Somali 
clan structure and hence were forced or chose to leave Somalia.
(NOT) A JANNAH19
When it comes to the United States, the place most associated with the Somali immi-
gration is Minnesota. According to the 2000 census, the number of Somalis living in 
this state was 11,000 At the same time, the Minnesota Demographic Center estimated 
that there might be 25,000 Somalis living in Minnesota in the period between 2010 -12 
(including children) and the American Community Survey claimed that 21,200 people 
of Somali origin lived in the state during that period of time. According to Ms. Abdi, 
Somali community organizations give numbers reaching 70,000 for the Minnesota and 
St. Paul area20. Despite the numbers, the Minnesota diaspora is still the heart of the U.S. 
Somali community, especially so because back in the 1990s the state was an example of 
economic prosperity with the reinvention of Minneapolis and St. Paul, therefore it was 
an ideal option for Somali resettlement21. However, job opportunities were not easily 
open to the Somalis due to certain limitations that included the following: 1) language 
skills, 2) education, 3) cultural background, 4) gender issues, 5) family affairs. These 
limitations influence the decision about the place of settlement – it seems easier to fol-
low already existing patterns or relatives living in the United States rather than trying to 
build up new communities, especially since Somali families are big and family ties are 
really strong. Looking after other family members, even distant ones is considered as 
a moral obligation, so it is not a rare situation that one person provides for a few others 
back home. Somalis who made their way in the USA feel obliged to help their relatives 
who remain in Somalia, Kenya or the Middle East to get access to the land of opportuni-
ties. Although American immigration laws facilitate the family reunification program, 
in many Somali cases applications are still rejected, because even if some are considered 
family by Somalis themselves, they cannot be accepted by the U.S. law22.
Most Somalis arrive with no knowledge or very poor knowledge of English. Due 
to their financial situation, they usually cannot afford to attend language courses, and 
hence undertake low paid jobs that require low qualifications. Very often, it is only one 
person in the broad definition of family that is providing for all the people living inside 
the household. However, in many cases it is unacceptable for men to be supported by 
19 The word: jannah means paradise in Somali.
20 Following data collected by: C.M. Abdi, Elusive Jannah…, p. 174.
21 ‘Minnesota’s Job Market: Land of 10,000 Opportunities’, The Economist, 17 May 1999.
22 C.M. Abdi, Elusive Jannah…, pp. 169 -229.
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women, even if they finish some courses or are engaged in programs that allow them to 
get better qualifications in English or any job profession. It is especially hard for them 
due to the gender equality model that is being promoted in the U.S., which differs from 
the traditional Somali model of roles in which the man provides for his family. Further-
more, it is not a random situation that a Somali man has a wife or even two wives back 
in Somalia or Kenya, so if the woman takes up the male role, she has to provide for them 
as well. This very often leads to marriage conflicts or even divorces. Similar situations 
occur in reference to the access to education. Many Somalis do not have access to edu-
cation because of their financial situation and family obligations to work or take care of 
the younger siblings. Also, poor language skills make Somalis unable to access schools. 
Young Somali people very often have a problem with cultural adaptation among other 
peers. This is especially visible among young Somali women who were the hijab and 
who often meet the opposition of the families in going to the co -educational schools. As 
a consequence, they are more exposed to the adaptation problems as well as lack of ac-
ceptance from other students. Moreover, wearing traditional clothes forbids the under-
taking of some activities or even factory work that might expose women to additional 
danger. Thus, consequently, it is very often opposed by some of the employers and teach-
ers. Both professional and educational lives of Somalis depend on their cultural back-
ground and family ties as well as the traditional role of men and women. After arriving 
in the United States, the traditional model and values are confronted with the modern, 
gender equality of American reality. Still, many young women manage to combine tradi-
tion with education, professional experience and community work. Hence, most of the 
Somalis declare that USA is not their final destination and one day they would like to 
return home. For many of them, United States turned out to be a disappointment, and 
the living conditions did not reflect their ideas. On the contrary, to many immigrant 
groups, perhaps because of their nomadic roots, most of the Somalis see their presence 
on the American soil as temporary. Nevertheless, they cannot define the term “tempo-
rary”; usually when they are asked about that they point at their: 1) material situation 
– they plan to stay until they will be able to improve their financial situation 2) until the
security in Somalia improves and they will be able to go back home. The security para-
dox is that even though Somalis seek shelter in the USA, to some extent they are very of-
ten perceived as a threat by the public opinion (the consequence of the terrorism threat
and confirmed cases of Islamic radicalization in the Somali community in Minnesota).
ReMITTANCeS
According to Andrés Soliman, remittances are: “a growing and relatively stable source 
of development finance which are the complement for national savings, bring foreign 
exchange and provide a source for capital formation (especially small -scale projects)”23. 
23 A. Soliman, Remittances by Emigrants: Issues and Evidence, Santiago de Chile 2003, p. 1 (Macroe-
conomía del Desarrollo, 26).
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65%24 of all remittances go to developing countries, proportionally to the migration rates 
from the regions such as Sub -Saharan Africa (SSA), MENA (Middle East and North 
Africa), Latin America and the Caribbean, East Asia and Pacific. Every year, around 1.3 
bln U.S. dollars are being sent back home to Somalia, accounting for between 25 -45% of 
the Somali economy, so more than humanitarian aid, development aid and foreign di-
rect investment combined25. Most of these resources flow to Somalia directly from: Nai-
robi, Minneapolis, Melbourne, Toronto, London, and Copenhagen. Money Transfers 
Operators (MTO) estimates that 80% of the small businesses in Somalia is being started 
due to the money transfers from the diaspora26. MTOs themselves formatted due to the 
lack of a banking system in the conflict -torn Somalia. They evolved from the informal 
money transfers systems, hawalas, and were to some extent expected by the foreign gov-
ernments of the countries from which the diaspora was sending money, especially Kenya 
and the United States. As both, Kenyan and American authorities have been long inter-
ested in hawalas activities due to the suspicion of terrorism support. First warnings of 
the possibilities of closing the U.S. -Somali financial corridor were announced after the 
9/11 attacks, but no serious actions were undertaken until 2011 when Sunrise Commu-
nity Banks announced that it would close the Somali MTOs. In 2015, USA closed some 
of the hawalas offices at which they suspected undocumented money transfers or direct 
and indirect transfers to al -Shabaab. From the economic perspective, money transfers 
support dependency of the Somali economy, especially that one out of three Somalis 
back in Somalia claims that without remittances they would be unable to pay for basic 
facilities and provide for the education of their children. On the other hand, for women 
remittance flows are very often the only possibility to get access to the family money and 
in their case might be seen as an element of empowerment27.
In the case of American Somalis, firstly, they see financial transfers as their moral 
obligation towards their relatives back in the refugee camps in Kenya or those living 
in Somalia. Secondly, they are seen as investment into one’s future and building trust 
between the migrant and his/her relatives in the case of the future return. The relation 
between immigrants -relatives and transfers is often seen as a form of contract and thus 
one can differentiate between two main forms of contracts:
 Loan repayment – as usually it is the family that invests in the education and 
journey of one of their relatives, the person being granted the money is obliged 
to repay after he or she settles abroad.
 Co -insurance – a family member who was sent abroad becomes the economic 
insurance for his/her relatives as especially in the developing countries, the eco-
nomic situation and hence bank institutions and money insurance are really un-
stable or do not exist at all.
24 Ibid., p. 2.
25 P. Scott et al., Hanging By a Thread: The Ongoing Threat to Somalia’s Remittance Lifeline, Joint Agen-
cy Briefing Note, Oxfam, 19 February 2015, p. 1.
26 Ibid., p. 2.
27 Ibid., pp. 1 -9.
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Generally speaking, remittances can be divided into two main categories: 1) mon-
etary transfers and 2) in -kind. Money transfers measured in U.S. dollars directly in-
crease the availability of foreign exchange in the migrant’s country of origin, whereas 
in -kind save foreign exchange for the recipient country. Transfers are made not only in 
cash, but also as the donation of goods. Furthermore, they are not always sent to the 
relatives’ households, but also can be transferred as donations to various organizations 
– charity, mosques, religious institutions or even organizations related to suspicious ac-
tivity (with crime or terrorist links), especially that transferring goods instead of money 
makes it even harder to follow. Moreover, not all the remittances are sent through the
official channels, which causes difficulties in following the exact appropriation of the
funds. There is also one more important distinction between the remittances: 1) they
might be sent regularly throughout the duration of the migrants’ stay in another coun-
try or 2) they might be brought back home from emigration as one time cash/goods
inflow28.
In general, remittances are considered as a good impact on the Somali economy 
both in the short and long -term run. In theory, they could be a basis for investment by 
the Somalis themselves which is a highly desirable model for the developing countries, 
and a stimulus to consumption. However, in the case of Somalia as well as other devel-
oping states, the mechanism is not working as it should. The reasons behind for this 
state of affairs are usually believed to be the lack of sustainability in this output, espe-
cially with the new migration – when the immigrants are not yet well adapted in the 
new country and their income is fluid. Thus, the American diaspora is still the biggest 
provider of the remittances, but transfers lack the proper mechanisms of financial con-
trol, especially after their arrival in Somalia29.
AMeRICAN SOMALIS AND THe POTeNTIAL TeRRORISM THReAT
Remittances are only one of the sources of the terrorism paranoia that grew around 
the U.S. Somali population throughout the years. On the other hand, one cannot ex-
clude certain risks that are present especially among the young members of the dias-
pora. However, these are not related particularly to the Somali group but rather are the 
result of certain socio -economic factors. In many cases, the radicalization is related to 
the phenomena that Oliver Roy referred to as re -Islamization – therefore a secondary 
turn towards the traditional values that are missing among Muslim immigrants, or their 
children who have American citizenship, but rather redefine themselves as radical Mus-
lims instead of Americans or even Somalis, and hence they try to fit themselves into the 
global jihad movement30. However, the emphasis must be placed on the understanding 
of the term radicalization itself. According to Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt radi-
28 Ibid., pp. 2 -13.
29 Ibid., pp. 2 -13.
30 O. Roy, ‘EuroIslam: The Jihad Within?’, National Interest, No. 71 (2003), pp. 63 -73.
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calization should be understood as the progress in searching, finding, accepting, cultivat-
ing and developing the extreme belief system to the moment where it might be used as the 
catalyst for the terrorist act31. But still radicalization can be motivated not only religious-
ly, but also ideologically or be the effect of other experiences. In the case of Somalis the 
main reasons behind the radicalization of young people are:
 Economic exclusion – as poverty is very often the cause for many extreme in-
stances of behavior.
 Social exclusion – sometimes the feeling of social exclusion plays an even more 
important role than the economic one. In the United States this is related to the 
difficulties in cultural adaption and acceptance by the peers as well as racism.
 Moreover, United States’ foreign policy and the security precautions under-
taken by the authorities were the source of conflict. For a very long time, also 
U.S.–Somali relations were suspended and still, Washington has been investing
money in training and arming the AFRICOM. It is especially for young people
whose parents were forced to leave the country of origin, the lack of progress in
the situation in Somalia, but still enormous engagement of the U.S. military in
the region that might be confusing32.
In the period of 2007 and 2012 there were several confirmed cases of the Ameri-
can Somalis who went back to Somalia in order to radicalize themselves and join al-
-Shabaab. Such cases were mostly manifest among the second and third generation of 
the Somalis, so the people already born on the U.S. territory. The most famous exam-
ple was Omar Hammami, born in Minnesota and killed in Somalia after becoming 
a ‘freedom fighter’. Hammami helped to develop al -Shabaab’s media strategy. The new 
media became the main source of recruitment giving the young people know -how 
and further convincing them that training and fighting in Somalia will be the com-
plement of their hijrah33. According to Peter Neumann, after 2012 -2013, al -Shabaab 
noted a visible decrease in the amount of the recruits34. There are some concerns that 
31 M. D. Silber, A. Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, New York Police Depart-
ment, New York 2007, at <http://freebeacon.com/wp -content/uploads/2016/01/NYPD_Report-
-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf>, 15 December 2015.
32 B. Doosje, A. Loseman, K. van de Boss, ‘Determinants of Radicalization of Islamic Youth on the Neth-
erlands: Personal Uncertainty, Perceived Justice, and Perceived Group Threat’, Journal of Social Is-
sues, Vol. 69, No. 3 (2013), pp. 586 -604, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/josi.12030>; S. M. Murshed, 
S. Pavan, ‘Identity and Islamic Radicalization in Western Europe’, Civil Wars, Vol. 13, No. 14 (2011), 
pp. 261 -276. 
33 Hijrah in Islam is a religious pilgrimage in order to protect and preach Islamic principles. It is modeled 
on Prophet Muhammad’s escape from Mecca to Medina.
34 A. Meleagrou -Hitchens, S. Maher, J. Sheehan, Lights, Camera, Jihad: Al -Shabaab’s Western Media 
Strategy, ICSR Report, London 2012, at <http://icsr.info/2012/11/icsr -report -lights -camera -jihad-
-al -shabaabs -western -media -strategy/>, 16 January 2016; author’s consultations with Dr. Peter Neu-
mann, Professor of Security Studies at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London and 
Director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation during the author’s participation 
in the UCSIA Summer School: Religion, Culture and Society: Entanglement and Confrontation: “Is 
Faith -based Violence Religious?” held in, Antwerp, Belgium in August, 2015.
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the interest of those of the Somalis who might be potentially interested in the Islamic 
radicalization switched to ISIS.
SOMALIS AS A PART OF THe SUB ‑SAHARAN AFRICAN MIGRATION
Although Somalis are geographically and culturally placed somewhere between SSA 
and MENA regions, they still are classified by the American authorities as the part 
of the Sub -Saharan migration. Somalis are one of the smallest African migrations in 
the United States. They are also relatively a young migration. Generally speaking, the 
African migration is one of the fastest growing migrations in the United States with 
the relatively high employment and education rates, although that varies between par-
ticular groups. Only in 2009, 74% of African migrants identified themselves as Black 
and the number of the Black African immigrants increased in the period between 
2000 and 2008 -09 by 88%. The biggest minority from Sub -Saharan Africa are still 
1) Nigerians who in 2000 constituted 23% of all SSA migrants, whereas in 2008 -09
the number slightly decreased to 19%, followed by 2) Ethiopians (12% in 2000 and
13% in 2008 -09), Ghanaians (11% in 2000, 10% in 2008 -09), Kenyans35 (5% in 2000
and 6% in 2008 -09) and Somalis (6% both in 2000 and 2008 -09)36. The Migration
Policy Institute estimates that in 2007 there were 39,000 Somalis in the U.S. from
whom 44% have not completed high school, 19% had a two -year college degree, 7%
completed the master’s program and only 3% received a doctoral degree. At the same
time, only 6% of Somalis spoke English at home, 10% declared no knowledge of this
language, but still 35% spoke English very well. When it comes to the employment
rate, 54% of the Somalis in the ages of 18 -64 were employed, the rate was at the level
of 66% for men and 44% for women. The median annual earnings for Black African
Immigrants was $27,000, but still for Nigerians they reached the level of $36,000,
while for Somalis only $18,000. As far as the overall unemployment rate among the
representatives of the Black African Immigration compared to other regions in 2009
is concerned, the rate was 36% for the recent immigrants, compared to 45% among
Latin Americans and 22% in the case of the long -term immigrants, comparing to 35%
in the case of immigrants from Latin America. Therefore the data about manual an-
nual earnings and the unemployment rate might be inconsistent as a great number
of Black African Immigrants work on the Black Market37. In conclusion, the Black
African Immigrant group has a better position than the group from Latin America.
However, there is a considerable degree of variability within the ethnic groups that
constitute the group and therefore the Somali migration usually has a worse position
35 Nowadays, young Kenyans are the fastest growing short -term SSA professional migration, coming to 
the USA on professional contracts or at the universities.
36 R. Capps, K. McCabe, M. Fix, Diverse Streams: African Migration to the United States, Migration 
Policy Institute, Washington D.C. 2012, at <http://fcd -us.org/sites/default/files/African%20Migra-
tion%20to%20the%20United%20States.pdf>, 17 January 2016.
37 Ibid., pp. 14 -18. 
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and is not as educated in comparison to the other Black African Immigrant groups in 
the USA. Somalis differ also in their cultural and adaptation patterns and face certain 
difficulties in this asspect. They usually undertake blue -collar jobs and although they 
intended differently, they are a long -term immigration. It might be the effect of the 
conflict -thorn collapsed state experience38, in many cases the refugee experience and 
lack of the educational opportunities among the first generation emigrating from So-
malia, Kenya or Ethiopia.
CONCLUSION
Although Somalis are a small African community within the huge melting pot of im-
migration coming every year to the United States, it is certainly an important one. 
However, they usually earn less and are less educated than other representatives of the 
Black African immigration from Sub -Saharan Africa, they are still copingwell, con-
sidering their number and comparatively recent immigration history. Certain patterns 
occur among diaspora in both settlement and cultural adaptation. As far as the settle-
ment is concerned they certainly follow family ties in places which were mentioned 
earlier e.g.: Minnesota (especially Minneapolis), Ohio (especially Columbus), Virgin-
ia, Georgia, the New York City metropolitan area, the Washington D.C. Metropoli-
tan area, San Diego, therefore very often the family relations are far more important 
than the economic calculations. Most of the Somalis arrive to the USA: 1) as asylum 
seekers and refugees 2) due to the family reunification programs 3) for teconomic 
reasons with the intention of returning to Somalia or Kenya as soon as possible. U.S. 
Somali immigration has been developing in a more or less stable manner throughout 
the years, although the younger generation has easier access to the English language 
and education. As for the cultural adaptation, the Somali group faces some difficulties 
especially in relation to the gender issues and changes of the roles of men and women. 
As a result, many divorces occur. Adaptation is also difficult for female students as it 
happens very often that wearing traditional clothes in not accepted by their peers (the 
same case is related to the workers who want to hire Somali women). As most of the 
Somalis are blue -collar workers, it is also difficult for many women to find someone 
to take care of their children when they are working39. There are also certain contro-
versies that are still present around the Somali group when it comes to the female cir-
38 The conflict -thorn collapsed state seems to describe the Somali state condition in the most appropri-
ate way, especially so because according to Abdulahi A. Osman and Isaaka K. Souaré, Somalia was 
mostly an authoritarian regime (Siad Barre’s regime) but until a certain point it was a functioning state 
after it regained independence in 1960. See: AA. Osman, I. K. Souaré (eds.), Somalia at the Cross-
roads…; R. Kłosowicz, ‘Państwa dysfunkcyjne w Afryce Subsaharyjskiej’ in: idem (ed.), Państwa dys-
funkcyjne i międzynarodowe wysiłki zmierzające do ich naprawy, Kraków 2014, pp. 11 -64 (Studia nad 
Rozwojem); The Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index 2005 -2015, at <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/>, 
29 January 2016.
39 C. M. Abdi, Elusive Jannah…, pp. 187 -207.
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cumcision, which is not accepted by the majority of the Western societies and hence 
by the American society as well.
In the case of the remittances, both money and good transfers are seen as the moral 
obligation towards the relatives that were left in Somalia, Kenya or even Ethiopia, the 
same case as the family unification. However, not least important is the perception 
of the remittances as the contract between one person and his/her relatives in order 
to improve the overall financial situation in the family, or as the investment for the 
future, especially that many of the Somalis consider the possibility of a permanent 
return home as soon as they earn enough money and/or the security situation in So-
malia improves.
There is no evidence to believe that Somalis are more prone to radical behavior such 
as Islamic radicalization. Usually, if the incidents occur, they are related to the personal 
cases and experiences such as trauma, sense of exclusion or socio -economic patterns. It 
seems that at certain point Somalis were scapegoated by the public opinion as well as 
many other Muslim groups in the United States. As always, in the case of security, cer-
tain government activities such as the Patriot Act together with the occurring terrorist 
incidents both in the state and around the world, might result in extreme behavior of 
some part of the population towards the other. This issue should certainly be improved 
in the future by both local, federal authorities and non -governmental organizations.
Last but not least, we still do not know much about the clan and sub -clan struc-
ture of the U.S. Somali diaspora and the distribution of the people from different clan 
groups, including the six important clans: Digil, Rahanwayn, Dir, Darood, Hawiye and 
Isaaq. Similar to the case study of Ethiopians, even in the immigration those groups 
occur as defragmented and divided and therefore not many Somali organizations are 
operating within the United States. Somalis usually gather in the organizations and 
centers dedicated to the assistance of all immigrants, African immigrants groups or ref-
ugee centers. The only exception are Somali Bantus and Benadiri Somalis whose im-
migration to the United States as the persecuted groups started during the period of 
Siad Barre’s regime. Together with the Benadiri Somalis a great number writers, poets, 
artists and clergymen arrived. Consequently, the Benadiri Community of Minnesota is 
one of the best organized Somali groups in the United States, working through various 
organizations on the local community level40.
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